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Abstract: I revisit the popular concern over a nonlinearity or threshold in the relationship between
public debt and growth employing long time series data from up to 27 countries. My empirical ap-
proach recognises that standard time series arguments for long-run equilibrium relations between
integrated variables (cointegration) break down in nonlinear specifications such as those predomi-
nantly applied in the existing debt-growth literature. Adopting the novel co-summability approach
my analysis overcomes these difficulties to find no evidence for a systematic long-run relationship
between debt and growth in the bivariate and economic theory-based multivariate specifications
popular in this literature.
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1 Introduction
“The latest research [by Reinhart and Rogoff] suggests that once debt reaches more than about
90% of GDP the risks of a large negative impact on long term growth become highly significant.”
George Osborne, Mais Lecture, February 24, 2010
“The study [Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b)] found conclusive empirical evidence that total debt
exceeding 90 percent of the economy has a significant negative effect on economic growth.”
‘The Path to Prosperity,’ House Committee on the Budget, April 5, 2011
Despite the rhetoric adopted by a number of governments and opposition parties over recent years,
determining a causal link from public debt to long-run growth as well as the potential nonlinearity
of this relationship are widely regarded as unresolved empirical issues (IMF, 2012; Panizza and
Presbitero, 2014). As above quotes indicate the most influential research on the debt-growth nexus
in recent years is unarguably the work by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b) which has been adopted as
justification for fiscal austerity measures by politicians on both sides of the Atlantic. Although re-
cent revelations challenged the descriptive analysis carried out in their paper, Reinhart and Rogoff
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maintain that “the weight of the evidence to date — including this latest comment [by Herndon,
Ash and Pollin, 2014] — seems entirely consistent with our original interpretation of the data”
(Wall Street Journal ‘Real Time Economics’ blog, April 16, 2013), namely that “high debt/GDP
levels (90 percent and above) are associated with notably lower growth outcomes” (Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2010b: 577; see also Rogoff, 2013). Perhaps aware of the tension between the causal
interpretation typically read into this type of statement and the descriptive nature of their analy-
sis, some of their earlier work (Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2012) already pointed to a set of
empirical studies which are argued to address both concerns regarding causality and identification
of a nonlinearity in the long-run debt-growth relationship (e.g. Kumar and Woo, 2010; Balas-
sone, Francese and Pace, 2011; Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli, 2011; Checherita-Westphal and
Rother, 2012)1 in support of their findings.
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This paper investigates the debt-growth nexus from a new angle and with a somewhat more modest
aim, focusing on the persistence of the long time series data used in the original Reinhart and Ro-
goff (2010b) study. I adopt annual data for over two centuries (1800–2010) to investigate whether
linear or various nonlinear specifications of the debt-growth nexus constitute ‘long-run equilib-
rium relations’ in four OECD countries: the United States, Great Britain, Japan and Sweden;2
additional work presented in an Online Appendix extends the analysis to 27 advanced and devel-
oping economies. The analysis employs the most popular specifications in this empirical literature
– polynomial functions and piecewise linear (threshold) specifications – to model the hypothesised
nonlinearity. The basic premise of my analysis is that if variable series are integrated (nonstation-
ary), then the popular implementations of nonlinearity in the debt-growth literature (squared debt
terms or debt terms interacted with threshold dummies) are invalid, since these transformations of
the variable are not defined within the (co-)integration framework. Therefore any empirical results
building on these polynomial or threshold specifications may be spurious.
My empirical strategy addresses this problem by adopting novel methods for summability and co-
summability testing (Berenguer-Rico and Gonzalo, 2014a,b). These concepts provide a framework
encompassing integration and cointegration which however extends to non-linear relationships.
The analysis in this study is thus (narrowly) focused on the question of potential nonlinearities
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in the long-run debt-growth relationship, bypassing any concerns over the direction of causation
which does not impact the statistical validity of the results. If there is no evidence for (nonlinear)
long-run relations, then standard empirical specifications in the literature adopting thresholds or
polynomial functions are misspecified and the causal interpretation assigned in these studies is
questionable: the presence of a long-run equilibrium is a pre-requisite for the existence of any
long-run causal relationship in the data. Results have important policy implications given that
the most vocal supporters of fiscal austerity have pointed to the above-cited studies as providing
empirically sound evidence for (this type of) nonlinearities in the debt-growth relationship.
The primary empirical focus is to investigate data for debt and GDP in Great Britain, Japan, Swe-
den and the United States over the 1800–2010 time horizon. In additional analysis I investigate
sub-periods of 60 years using rolling window analysis to allow for structural breaks in the debt-
growth relationship and also to reduce the impact of global shocks such as World War II on the
presence or absence of a long-run relationship. A host of further robustness checks are confined to
an Online Appendix.
My core analysis finds no evidence for any long-run relationship between debt and growth in the
linear or nonlinear specifications for the four countries investigated. Subsample analysis does not
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fundamentally challenge this finding although it provides an indication that there may have been
long-run relationships between debt and growth at different points in time, although not in the
post-WWII period typically studied in the existing literature. The general patterns revealed by the
subsample analysis supports the notion that the debt-growth relationship differs across countries
and “with economic circumstances” (Larry Summers, Witness Statement to the US Senate Bud-
get Committee, June 4, 2013). Additional empirical analysis goes to great lengths to determine
whether the choice of countries, time periods, and/or atheoretical specifications drive this finding
but arrives at a fairly consistent picture across all different modes of investigation. These findings
help challenge the apparent consensus in parts of the empirical literature of both the existence and
the common nature of a debt threshold across countries.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the next section discusses the existing literature
on debt and growth, with Section 3 providing the theoretical background for my econometric
approach. Section 4 introduces the data and describes the debt-growth nexus in each of the four
OECD countries which are at the core of my analysis. Results for these and a larger set of countries
are presented and discussed in Section 5, before Section 6 concludes.
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2 Existing Literature
The existing empirical literature on the debt-growth nexus builds on somewhat ambiguous theoret-
ical foundations (for a recent survey see Panizza and Presbitero, 2014). Some theoretical models
argue that higher stocks of public debt may create increased uncertainty or even fear of future fi-
nancial repression among investors and thus lead to a negative long-run relationship (Elmendorf
and Mankiw, 1999; Teles and Mussolini, 2014) between debt and growth. Other work maintains
that this negative relationship disappears once sticky wages and unemployment are taken into ac-
count in the modelling process (Greiner, 2011). The nonlinearity or debt threshold hypothesised
and investigated in most empirical work can be motivated for developing countries by pointing to
the issue of debt overhang (Krugman, 1998; Sachs, 1989), although it may be difficult to extend
this argument to advanced economies such as those investigated in this paper. Nonlinearities may
further arise if there is a tipping point of fiscal sustainability as is developed in Ghosh, Kim, Men-
doza, Ostry and Qureshi (2013), however I am not aware of any theoretical models incorporating
such debt tipping points into a framework for economic growth over the long-run.
As was suggested above, the work by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009; 2010a,b; 2011) is largely de-
scriptive in nature, although this should not distract from the significant contribution these authors
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have made to the literature in the construction of long data series for empirical analysis. Regres-
sion analysis of the debt-growth nexus conducted using panel data typically shares the unease
about misspecification and endogeneity with the wider cross-country growth literature (for a dis-
cussion of the latter see Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2005; Eberhardt and Teal, 2011). Empirical
specifications in this literature are across the board partial adjustment models in the mould of
Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) – regressing growth on a lagged level of per
capita GDP and a measure for debt stock as well as typically a large number of control variables
– in a pooled model specification, thus assuming away the possibility of parameter heterogeneity
across countries.3 The standard practice in the cross-country literature to average data over three-
or five-year intervals in the panel is also adopted in all but the most recent papers (Checherita-
Westphal and Rother, 2012; Baum, et al, 2013; Panizza and Presbitero, 2014). Samples differ
significantly across existing studies, with the work by Kumar and Woo (2010), Cecchetti et al
(2011), Checherita-Westphal and Rother(2012), Baum, et al (2013), and Panizza and Presbitero
(2014) primarily focused on OECD and other high-income economies and thus most relevant to
this study. Among these OECD country studies the only one to adopt a polynomial specification
is the paper by Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), although this practice is popular in the
study of developing economies (e.g. Cordella, et al, 2010; Calderon and Fuentes, 2013; Pres-
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bitero, 2012). With the exception of Cecchetti, et al (2011), who apply the within (fixed effects)
estimator and thus cannot address concerns over reverse causality, all of the above empirical stud-
ies implement their panel analysis adopting the Blundell and Bond (1998) System GMM estimator
originally developed for firm-level panel data analysis.4
Despite different sample periods, country coverage, control variables, modelling of the nonlinear-
ity and choice of moment conditions for identification, these studies come to remarkably similar
conclusions, namely that beyond a threshold at around 90% debt-to-GDP the relationship between
debt and growth is negative significant. However, as demonstrated by Panizza and Presbitero
(2013), these findings are either not robust to small changes in the sample, suggesting the results
are driven by outliers, or fail to formally test the coefficients on the pairwise linear terms, which
on closer inspection typically cannot support the notion of a statistically significant change in the
debt coefficient above the threshold.
All of the above studies are focused on pooled panel data modelling, implicitly assuming that
the long-run equilibrium relationship between debt and growth is the same for all countries in
the sample. Existing research has found very different results when moving away from full sam-
ple analysis in homogeneous parameter regression models and toward sub-sample analysis along
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geographic, institutional or income lines (IMF, 2012; Kourtellos, et al, 2012; Eberhardt and Pres-
bitero, 2015). There are a number of reasons to assume the equilibrium relationship between debt
and growth could differ across countries. Vulnerability to public debt depends not only on debt
levels, but also on debt composition IDB (2007). Unfortunately, existing data for the analysis of
debt and development often represent a mix of information relating to general and central gov-
ernment debt, debt in different currency denominations and with different terms attached (be they
explicit or implicit). All of this implies that comparability of the debt data across countries may
be compromised Panizza and Presbitero (2013). In addition, even assuming that debt stocks are
comparable across countries and over time, the possible effect of public debt on GDP may depend
on the reason why debt has been accumulated and on whether it has been consumed or invested
(and in the latter case in which economic activities). Furthermore, different stocks of debt may
impinge differently on economic growth: debt can clearly hinder GDP growth when it becomes
unsustainable, affecting interest rates and triggering a financial crisis, thus affecting the level of
GDP. However, the capacity to tolerate high debts depends on a number of country-specific char-
acteristics, related to past crises and the macro and institutional framework (Reinhart, Rogoff and
Savastano, 2003; Kraay and Nehru, 2006; Manasse and Roubini, 2009). For these reasons the
focus of analysis in this paper is on country-by-country investigation of the long-run relationship
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between debt and growth.
A recent study which empirically investigates the debt-growth nexus with a time series econometric
approach is the paper by Balassone, et al (2011) on Italy (1861-2009). Adopting unit root and
cointegration testing prior to estimation they establish a long-run relationship between per capita
GDP, per capita capital stock and debt-to-GDP ratio (all in logarithms). They then go on to estimate
(among other models) a piecewise linear specification for the debt-to-GDP ratio where values
beyond a threshold of 100% are found to create a significantly stronger negative effect on growth
– it is precisely this form of interaction between a threshold dummy and the debt-to-GDP ratio
which is not defined under (linear) cointegration and which necessitates the present analysis.5 It
should also be noted that cointegration does not imply causation from debt to growth.
3 Nonlinear Relations between Integrated Processes
3.1 Methodology
In this section I highlight the difficulties arising for conventional time series analysis when as-
suming a non-linear model in the presence of integrated variables and discuss a novel approach to
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tackle these issues.
Suppose a time series relationship yt = f(xt, θ) + ut for a nonstationary regressor xt ∼ I(1),
stationary ut and some non-linear function f(·). Assuming for illustration f(xt) = θ1xt + θ2x2t ,
let xt = xt−1 + x0 + εt and εt ∼ i.i.d.(0, σ2ε), then we know that
V[xt − xt−1] = σ2ε ⇒ xt ∼ I(1) (1)
In words, it can be shown that the (Engle and Granger, 1987, henceforth EG) characterisation of a
stationary process holds for ∆xt – finite variance is one of five EG characteristics. Now investigate
the same property for ∆x2t :
V[x2t − x2t−1] = E[ε4t ] + 4(t− 1)σ4ε − σ4ε ⇒ x2t ∼ I(?)
Here the finite variance characteristic is clearly violated, given that the variance is a function of
time. Since this problem cannot be solved by further differencing it is not possible to determine
the order of integration of x2t . This in turn creates fundamental problems if the empirical analysis
of yt = θ1xt+θ2x2t +ut is to be based on arguments of cointegration. The difficulty arises from the
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requirement of the EG characterisation to investigate the differences of a process, with the intrinsic
linearity of the difference operator creating obvious problems for nonlinear processes.
The following briefly introduces a novel set of methods for nonlinear processes which closely
resemble the standard toolkit in linear time series analysis (tests for unit root behaviour and
cointegration). The motivation for these new methods is to create “a summary measure of the
stochastic properties – such as persistence – of the time series without relying on linear structures”
(Berenguer-Rico and Gonzalo, 2014b). The implementation of these tests is straightforward, in-
volving OLS regressions of transformed variable series, where transformations avoid the first dif-
ferencing so central to Dickey-Fuller-type unit root analysis and instead build on running sums.
Like in the case of unit root analysis the distributions of these test statistics are non-standard, but
estimates for sub-samples can be used to create confidence intervals for inference.
Berenguer-Rico and Gonzalo (2014b) build on earlier work by Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2006) to
develop a non-linear alternative to linear integration, based on the ‘order of summability.’6 The
empirical procedure to determine the order of summability analyses the rate of convergence of
a rescaled sum Y ∗k of the variable of interest yt. Using least squares we can estimate for k =
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1, . . . , T
Y ∗k = β
∗logk + U∗k (2)
where Y ∗k = Yk − Y1, U∗k = Uk − U1 and Yk = log
(∑k
t=1(yt −mt)
)2
.7 This regression
yields
βˆ∗ =
∑T
k=1 Y
∗
k logk∑T
k=1 log
2k
(3)
from which the estimate of the order of summability δˆ∗ = (βˆ∗ − 1)/2 is obtained. Inference can
be established using confidence intervals constructed from subsample estimation (Politis, Romano
and Wolf, 1999), whereby the above procedure is applied to T − b + 1 subsamples of length
b = int(
√
T ) + 1.8
Summability is a more general concept than integration, but they are closely related: if a series
xt is integrated of order d, I(d) for d ≥ 0, then it is also summable of order d, S(d); however,
not all S(d) processes are also I(d). Summability analysis thus provides important insights into
the time series properties of a variable but in contrast to unit root analysis is not limited to linear
processes. In the case of the debt-growth application I pursue here this allows me to investigate
the time series properties of squared and cubed debt-to-GDP ratios as well as piecewise linear
debt-to-GDP series.
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In a second step, Berenguer-Rico and Gonzalo (2014a) offer a test to investigate the ‘balance’ of
the empirical relationship, namely the condition that the two sides of the empirical equation have
the same order of summability: S(δy) = S(δz) for z = f(xt, θ) = θf(xt). Again there is a
close analogy with the linear unit root and cointegration case: before cointegration between two
or more variables can be tested, it is necessary to establish that these variables possess the same
order of integration. Regressing stationary on nonstationary variables – as would be the case if we
regressed the per capita GDP growth rate on the debt-to-GDP ratio in levels – is referred to as an
inconsistent regression which leads to invalid inference. However, in the present study I do not test
for balance due to an unresolved problem with the testing procedure which invalidates the results.9
It should be noted that the main arguments put forth in this paper are based on the co-summability
tests, which do not suffer the same problem.
Finally, the concept of co-summability is tested by investigating the error terms of a candidate
specification. In empirical practice, let eˆt be the least squares residuals from a balanced regres-
sion yt = θˆg(xt) + eˆt, then ‘strong co-summability’ will imply the order of summability of eˆt is
statistically close to zero, S(0) (Berenguer-Rico and Gonzalo, 2014a). Note the analogy to a lin-
ear cointegrating relationship where the residuals from a linear regression between I(1) variables
will be I(0). The order of summability for eˆt can be estimated to determine whether a candidate
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model is co-summable.10 Inference follows the subsampling approach as in the previous testing
procedures and under the null of co-summability the confidence interval includes zero.
3.2 Specifications
I adopt two specifications for nonlinearity in the debt-to-GDP ratio in line with standard approaches
in the literature: first, in addition to a standard linear model (Model 1) I use polynomial specifica-
tions including linear and squared (Model 2) or linear, squared and cubed (Model 3) debt-to-GDP
terms (in logarithms) – examples for this specification include Calderon and Fuentes (2012) and
Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012). Second, I adopt piecewise linear specifications where the
debt-to-GDP ratio (in levels, not logs) is divided into two variables made up of values below and
above a specified threshold, which is treated as exogenous (examples for this specification include
Kumar and Woo, 2010; Baum, et al, 2013; Panizza and Presbitero, 2014).11 For Great Britain I
adopt three threshold values: 90, 70 and 50 percent. For the United States and Japan I can only
adopt the 50 percent threshold since even over the full time horizon too few observations are above
the other two thresholds: only 12 (Japan: 22) for 70 percent and 6 (Japan: 17) for 90 percent. In
Sweden the debt-to-GDP ratio only surpasses the 50 percent threshold in 15 sample years (7% of
observations) so that I cannot investigate even a 50% threshold for this country. Note that all of the
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empirical approaches in the debt-growth literature discussed above are based on models which are
linear in parameters but non-linear in the variables – my implementation follows this assumption.
Although there are of course alternative transformations (e.g. ‘integrable functions’ proposed by
Park and Phillips, 2001) to model the potential nonlinearity in the debt-growth relationship I re-
strict myself to the above polynomial and threshold models since these feature in the vast majority
of empirical applications – see Panizza and Presbitero (2014) for a recent survey.
The co-summability analysis thus investigates a number of specifications for the debt-growth rela-
tionship, inspired by the simple Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b) setup. The polynomial specifications
are:
yt = α0 + ϕt+ φ1xt + εt (4)
yt = α0 + ϕt+ φ1xt + φ2x
2
t + εt (5)
yt = α0 + ϕt+ φ1xt + φ2x
2
t + φ3x
3
t + εt (6)
where y is per capita GDP and x is the debt-to-GDP ratio (both in logarithms), α0 is an intercept,
t a linear trend term with parameter ϕ and εt is white noise.
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The threshold model specifications are based on
yt = α0 + ϕt+ θ1Xt × 1(Xt < threshold) (7)
+ θ2Xt × 1(Xt ≥ threshold) + εt
where 1(Xt < threshold) is an indicator function which is 1 for the debt-to-GDP ratio Xt below
the threshold and 0 otherwise – similarly for 1(Xt ≥ threshold) at and above the threshold.
I investigate the evidence for long-run equilibrium relationships between debt burden and per
capita GDP levels – since the focus of the applied literature is on the long-run relationship I adopt
the levels variable for income, rather than its growth rate. The popularity of the ‘growth’ spec-
ification in the cross-country empirical literature is justified by the presence of the lagged level
of per capita GDP as additional regressor (as is the case for the ‘debt-growth’ analysis of Ku-
mar and Woo, 2010; Cecchetti, et al, 2011; Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012; Baum, et al,
2013; among others). This quasi-error correction specification provides estimates for a long-run
levels relationship although researchers frequently refer to this type of specification as a ‘growth’
equation (see Eberhardt and Teal, 2011).
In addition to the analysis for the full time horizon I investigate co-summability in the four OECD
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countries using a window of sixty years, which is moved along the time horizon from the 1800s
to 2010. The purpose of this exercise is to provide both an indication of possible changes in the
long-run debt-growth relationship over time as well as to safeguard the analysis from undue impact
of severe shocks such as the two world wars or changes in the definition or the debt variable.12 Due
to the nature of the data this approach is only feasible for the polynomial specifications: as high-
lighted by Chinn (2012) in his review of Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) there are comparatively few
episodes in developed economies where the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 90% and I can therefore not
implement the moving window for the piecewise linear specification. Since this rolling window
analysis represents a form of data mining I adjust the confidence intervals (CI) for all estimates
following a standard Bonferroni correction, whereby CI∗ = (1 − α/m) for the conventional con-
fidence level 1− α (I adopt α = .05) and the number of sub-samples tested m (varies from 80 for
Japan to 152 for the US, Great Britain and Sweden). In practice this makes the confidence intervals
much wider, thus representing a more conservative approach to rejecting the null hypothesis of co-
summability. A number of additional robustness checks are carried out, for which the motivation,
approach, and results are presented in an Online Appendix. The focus of these robustness checks
is on (i) a diverse sample of 23 additional economies (including some developing countries); (ii) a
reverse specification with debt-to-GDP ratio (in logs) as the dependent variable for models includ-
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ing the (log of) per capita GDP, and its squared and cubed polynomial terms as regressors; (iii)
economic theory-based specifications which add a number of determinants of growth as favoured
by the cross-country growth literature to the model.
4 Data
I use annual per capita GDP (in 1990 Geary-Khamis $) from an updated version (Bold and Van
Zenden, 2013) of the series compiled by Maddison (2010). I match these data to information on
the gross government debt-to-GDP ratio (in percent) from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). The debt
figures refer to total gross central government debt, comprising domestic and external debt (see
Online Appendix for exceptions). Data coverage differs across countries: for the US, Britain and
Sweden data series start in 1800, for Japan in 1872 – all series end in 2010.
Descriptive statistics for these four countries are presented in the Online Appendix, where I also
plot the levels and first differences of the per capita GDP and debt-to-GDP ratio variables (in logs).
Although my summability analysis provides insights into the time series properties of these data I
also carry out a number of unit root tests to illustrate the difference in order of integration between
the per capita GDP growth rate and the debt-to-GDP ratio in levels which rules out the existence of
22
any long-run relationship (cointegration, co-summability) between these two variable series.
In the Online Appendix data from a further 23 countries using the same sources are employed
to carry out summability and co-summability tests. Here countries were included in the sample
provided their per capita GDP and debt-to-GDP ratio series extended back to 1900 or earlier.
Extended empirical models analysed in an Online Appendix incorporate inflation and schooling
data primarily taken from the Clio Infra project at the International Institute of Social History,
population data from the original Maddison (2010) dataset, investment and additional debt data
from Maddison (1992), Mitchell (2007a,b), and the World Bank World Development Indicators as
well as a number of other sources (for details see Online Appendix).
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 charts the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio for the four economies, where in the spirit of
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) I highlight periods with debt burden in excess of 90% of GDP. While
the four time series all display idiosyncracies, it is nevertheless notable how similar in particular the
patterns for British and American debt-to-GDP ratios are over much of the 20th century, albeit with
substantially higher debt in the former. Britain is also the only economy studied which experienced
sustained periods of debt-to-GDP above 90%.
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[Figure 2 about here]
In Figure 2 I plot the debt-income relationship in each of the four countries, taking variables in
deviation from the country-specific time-series mean. In all four economies the most significant
turning points for the debt-growth nexus were marked by the Great War of 1914-18, the Great
Recession of the late 1920s and World War II.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Main results: Order of Summability
Table 1 provides estimates of the order of summability for all model variables, including polyno-
mial as well as threshold terms for debt. None of the confidence intervals for tests on per capita
GDP levels or any of the debt variables include zero, thus rejecting the null of summability of
order zero. The estimated order of summability for the per capita GDP growth rates in contrast is
always very close to zero. For the linear terms of per capita GDP and the debt-to-GDP ratio (in
logs or levels) and their growth rates these results are perfectly in line with unit root and station-
arity test results presented in the Online Appendix, where I establish stationary growth rates and
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nonstationary levels series (whether in logarithms or not).
These findings highlight the significant persistence in the data and provide a strong motivation
for the concerns over time series properties I argue are of primary importance when analysing the
long-run debt-growth nexus. In analogy to integrated data, we run the risk of spurious results in
any regressions containing these variables unless we can confirm our empirical models as balanced
and co-summable. Note that with the exception of the study by Balassone, et al (2011) on Italy
none of the papers in this literature show concern for time series properties of the data.
[Table 1 about here]
5.2 Main results: Co-Summability
Table 2 provides results from co-summability tests using per capita GDP levels as dependent vari-
able. Co-summability is rejected in all countries and specifications – residuals from these models
were not found to be summable of order zero, S(0). Note that the rejection of co-summability is by
no means marginal, with all confidence intervals some distance away from zero. The fact that sub-
sampling confidence intervals are at times very wide is a further strong signal for misspecification.
These findings imply that from a long-run perspective per capita income and the debt-to-GDP ratio
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do not move together, precluding any causal relationship between these variables.13
[Table 2 about here]
5.3 Results from Subsample Analysis
Subsample analysis yields three sets of results: (i) country-specific time-varying co-summability
statistics for the entire 152 subsamples (80 for Japan) of sixty years, which I present in graphical
form; (ii) comparison of the co-summability subsample results for the United States, Great Britain
and Sweden, again in graphical form – this is intended to uncover patterns of commonality and
difference in the equilibrium relationship across countries; (iii) co-summability statistics for the
post-WWII period as well as results omitting the most recent years covering the global financial
crisis (2008-2010).
Graphical results for the sub-sample analysis of co-summability, including Bonferroni-adjusted
confidence intervals, are presented in Figure 3.14 In each plot the end-year of the sixty-year window
of analysis is marked on the x-axis and shading indicates the Bonferroni-adjusted 95% confidence
intervals – due to different data availability this time dimension of the plots differ for Japan. Note
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first that across all models and countries the confidence intervals are fairly large, typically from 0
to 2 or larger. Second, while (Japan aside) in each country the share of samples which satisfy co-
summability is typically above 50%,15 this data property does not appear to be satisfied consistently
over longer stretches of time, but instead appears sporadically. Both of these findings provide a
strong signal of misspecification and thus echo the full sample results presented above.
In Table 3 I compare the subsample periods for which the sixty-year data series constituted co-
summable specifications in the data for the US, Great Britain and Sweden: Panel A refers to
the linear model (Model 1), Panels B and C to the polynomial specifications with (additional)
squared terms and squared and cubed debt terms, respectively (Models 2 and 3). For each country
a shaded cell indicates the sixty-year subsample ending in the year specified constitutes a co-
summable specification, while the intensity of the shading indicates whether this property occurs
in one (lightest), two (intermediate) or all three (darkest) countries. Japan is excluded in this
graphical analysis since the difference in available time series data would necessitate different
shading between earlier (excluding Japan) and later periods (including Japan) which would make
a mockery of my attempts to use graphs to illustrate commonality. I begin by focusing on those
‘episodes’ of long-run co-movement when the tests for all three countries find co-summability:
in all models clusters of such episodes can be found in the 1860s (thus for the series starting
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in the early 1800s), the 1890s-1910s (1830s–1850s), and the 1950s and 1960s (1890s–1900s,
incorporating both World Wars). Thereafter isolated episodes pop up in the 1970s. The most
recent episodes occurred in the early 2000s, which incorporate sample years during WWII and its
immediate aftermath. Taken together these various episodes account for 28% of all subsamples
across the three specifications.16 Note that the years of the global financial crisis (2008-10) do not
form part of this cluster of co-summable episodes in all three countries.
Referring back to Figure 2 it can be seen that the first of these clusters, covering subsamples ending
in the 1860s, occurred when all three countries substantially reduced their country-specific debt-
burden (movement to the left in Figure 2) albeit with comparatively modest increase in growth in
the US and Sweden (relatively flat line plots). No such pattern is revealed for the second cluster
for subsamples ending in the 1890s and 1900s, while the third cluster with end years in the 1950s
and 60s occurred when all three countries shifted from a relative debt build-up in years prior to and
during WWII to significant debt reduction thereafter, whereby the latter period also represented a
return to steady economic growth. The final cluster in the early 2000s again does not reveal any
systematic patterns in the evolution of debt burden and growth across these three economies.
Inbetween these episodes there are stretches where two countries have co-summable specifica-
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tions (around 31-38% of subsamples in each model), although these are often clustered around
the episodes just described. The remainder of subsamples is made up of single country episodes
(20-34% in each model) and subsamples with no co-summability in any country (7-16% in each
model).
Table 4 then zooms in on the post-WWII period which forms the focal point for virtually all exist-
ing empirical studies on the debt-growth nexus. Here we find some evidence for co-summability in
nonlinear specifications (these sub-samples are shaded in grey), especially for the model including
a cubed term. Note however that the confidence intervals for the overwhelming majority of these
results are very large (indicated with the darker shading), such that they include 1 and at times
even 2: a large confidence interval is indicative of serious misspecification and these findings of
co-summability should thus be treated with caution.
[Figure 3 and Table 3 about here]
These robustness checks provide a number of important insights: first, there is no overwhelming
evidence that these full sample results are severely distorted by global shocks or structural breaks
in the long-run debt-growth relationship, given that a very considerable share of subsamples were
found to not to be co-summable across all countries and specifications. Second, having said that
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my results point to a distinct possibility that certain countries experienced linear or nonlinear co-
movement between debt and income during certain periods of time over the past two centuries,
although seemingly much less so during the 20th century.
[Table 4 about here]
6 Concluding Remarks
This study took an alternative approach to investigating the presence of nonlinearities in the long-
run equilibrium relation between public debt and growth. Empirical results for four OECD coun-
tries using data from 1800 to 2010 and the various robustness checks carried out provide limited
evidence for nonlinear, or indeed linear, long-run relationships between these variables. There
are however certain subperiods over this long time horizon for which tests confirm co-movement
between debt and income. The timing of these subperiods of co-movement frequently appears to
differ across countries. These findings are not narrowly confined to the four OECD economies
studied in detail but seem to have much wider validity, and further are not an artefact of the sim-
ple model specification adopted: I investigated summability and co-summability in a sample of
23 additional countries (including some developing countries), and furthermore studied a num-
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ber of theory-based extended specifications for the four OECD economies; results in the Online
Appendix provide strong support for the findings presented above.
It is important to emphasise that this study does not and cannot address causality from high(er)
debt to low(er) growth as has been the focus in most of the empirical work on this topic. This is
by no means a shortcoming of the approach taken. Instead, it highlights a central inconsistency in
the empirical analysis of nonlinearities in the debt-growth relationship in the existing literature: in
order to establish a long-run causal relationship from debt to growth, it is necessary to first establish
a long-run equilibrium relationship. This study documents the difficulties for establishing the latter
using standard empirical specifications adopted in the literature when variable series are integrated.
Once these difficulties are addressed, I find no evidence for a long-run equilibrium relation in the
data for four OECD countries. Various robustness checks provide assurance that this finding is not
an artefact of sample selection. Since a long-run equilibrium relationship represents a pre-requisite
for any long-run causality between variables my analysis by necessity stops at this point.
The results presented in this paper undermine some of the popular conclusions for this politically-
charged issue which represent fiscal adjustment as a necessity for long-run economic stability and
sustainability. I do not claim that a high debt burden is a matter of no concern for policymakers
31
or that in the short-run debt may not be detrimental to growth. Instead, I highlight the absence of
evidence for nonlinearities such as the popular 90% debt-to-GDP threshold or polynomial spec-
ifications in the long-run relationship with growth and development, which has been the explicit
focus of the empirical literature I cite and review.
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Notes
1A further empirical study by Baum, Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2013) is cited in Rein-
hart, Reinhart and Rogoff (2012) but (erroneously) argues to focus on the short-run relationship.
They note that their sample selection is driven by the finding that data for 1990–2007 appears
stationary, whereas the longer 1980–2007 data appears nonstationary.
2The former two economies are presently at the centre of a policy debate relating sustainable
growth to fiscal austerity (e.g. US Senate Budget Committee, June 4, 2013), Japan is at times
taken as an example for sustained growth at comparatively high levels of debt, while Sweden
(alongside the US and Britain) represents the country with the longest time series in my matched
dataset.
3Notable exceptions include studies by Henderson and Parmeter (2013) and Kourtellos, Sten-
gos and Tan (2013) which emphasise the heterogeneity of the debt-growth nexus across countries
and adopt nonparametric methods to identify a threshold in the cross-section dimension.
4A thorough critique of this implementation in the macro panel context is beyond the scope
of this paper. Eberhardt and Teal (2010) highlight the problems arising, Bun and Sarafidis (2013)
provide an analysis of the impact of nonstationary initial conditions on this set of estimators while
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Pesaran and Smith (1995) discuss the bias arising from heterogeneity misspecification.
5Adopting the threshold specification I find that in my data series for Italy none of the various
thresholds adopted pass the co-summability test (100% threshold CI low 0.313, δˆeˆt=1.134, CI up
1.954; 90% CI low 0.486, δˆeˆt = 1.052, CI up 1.619; 70% CI low 0.910, δˆeˆt = 1.695, CI up 2.480;
50% CI low 0.811, δˆeˆt = 1.471, CI up 2.130) – see results section for notation.
6For a formal definition of summability see Definition 2 in Berenguer-Rico and Gonzalo (2014b).
7The deterministic component mt can be accounted for by the partial mean of yt, namely mt =
(1/t)
∑t
j=1 yj in case of a constant. Given the trending behaviour of my data I focus below on the
case of constant and linear trend terms, where partial demeaning of yt is carried out twice.
8I am grateful to a referee who emphasises that the validity of the subsampling procedure has
only been shown by simulation.
9A referee kindly pointed out that the properties of the balance statistic in a simple model of
yt = θxt+ut, with xt ∼ S(δ) and ut ∼ S(δ), are badly affected by θ, especially when θ 6= 1.
10The residual series eˆt will sum to zero by default of the least squares principle if our specifica-
tion includes an intercept; in practice the estimate for the intercept term is therefore not subtracted
when constructing eˆt.
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11Parts of the literature, including Baum, et al (2013), employ threshold regression algorithms
where the threshold value is determined endogenously. Extending the co-summability approach in
a similar fashion is beyond the scope of this study.
12The data used here refer to central government debt, which excludes any debt from local gov-
ernment, as opposed to general government debt. As shown in the work of Dippelsman, Dziobek
and Mangas (2012), the quantitative implications of this choice of variable can be stark. However,
in the absence of any general government debt data over the long time horizon the analysis here is
forced to employ the conceptually inferior ‘central government’ measures – this choice is however
aligned with the analysis in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b).
13In additional work presented in the Online Appendix I investigate a ‘reversed’ model for debt
with linear and polynomial terms of per capita GDP as the regressors and similarly find precious
little evidence for a long-run equilibrium relationship.
14Not adopting the Bonferroni adjustment would lead to significantly narrower confidence in-
tervals, which in all cases would yield the same or a stronger qualitative result of limited evidence
for a long-run equilibrium relationship between debt and income.
15The overall share of samples which satisfy co-summability is as follows: USA 50%, GBR
43
52%, SWE 49%, JPN 14% (Model 1); USA 56%, GBR 64%, SWE 64%, JPN 17% (Model 2);
USA 59%, GBR 73%, SWE 64%, JPN 28% (Model 3). Results are qualitatively similar if I adopt
a longer (70-year) window instead.
16In Model 1 they make up 17% of all subsamples, in Models 2 and 3 30% and 36% respec-
tively.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Evolution of Debt/GDP ratios
Notes: The shaded areas represent the periods where debt/GDP exceeded 90%.
45
Figure 2: Debt Ratio and Income Per Capita
Notes: Debt ratios and per capita GDP series (both in logarithms) are presented in deviation from
their country-specific time-series means (within transformation).
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Notes (to Figure 3): The shaded areas represent the Bonferroni-corrected 95% Confidence
Intervals for the Co-Summability statistic computed in a moving window of 60-year time periods.
The solid black line represents the computed Co-Summability statistic. I allow for an intercept in
the co-summability analysis. The coverage of the data differs across countries: for the US, Great
Britain and Sweden I have data from 1800-2010 (152 subsamples), for Japan from 1872-2010 (80
subsamples). Model 1 refers to a specification with linear debt terms only, Model 2 to a
specification with linear and quadratic debt terms, Model 3 further includes a cubed debt term.
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Table 1: Estimated Order of Summability
Country Start & End Year Obs Variable CI low δˆ CI up
USA 1800 2010 211 ln(GDP pc) 0.652 1.490 2.329
∆ln(GDP pc) -0.524 0.066 0.657
ln(Debt/GDP) 0.551 1.082 1.613
ln(Debt/GDP) squared 0.383 0.860 1.336
ln(Debt/GDP) cubed 0.404 0.993 1.582
168 Debt/GDP < 50% 0.313 0.825 1.337
43 Debt/GDP ≥ 50% 0.691 1.409 2.127
GBR 1800 2010 211 ln(GDP pc) 0.802 1.839 2.877
∆ln(GDP pc) -0.452 0.130 0.712
ln(Debt/GDP) 0.540 0.967 1.393
ln(Debt/GDP) squared 0.509 0.948 1.386
ln(Debt/GDP) cubed 0.475 0.931 1.387
100 Debt/GDP < 90% 0.511 1.062 1.613
111 Debt/GDP ≥ 90% 0.405 0.936 1.467
86 Debt/GDP < 70% 0.428 1.200 1.972
125 Debt/GDP ≥ 70% 0.465 0.923 1.381
64 Debt/GDP < 50% 0.447 1.068 1.689
147 Debt/GDP ≥ 50% 0.459 0.898 1.336
SWE 1800 2010 211 ln(GDP pc) 0.495 0.897 1.298
∆ln(GDP pc) -1.110 -0.378 0.355
ln(Debt/GDP) 0.645 1.624 2.603
ln(Debt/GDP) squared 0.704 1.577 2.451
ln(Debt/GDP) cubed 0.677 1.538 2.399
JPN 1872 2010 139 ln(GDP pc) 0.987 2.390 3.792
∆ln(GDP pc) -0.692 -0.004 0.683
ln(Debt/GDP) 0.427 1.091 1.755
ln(Debt/GDP) squared 0.433 1.101 1.769
ln(Debt/GDP) cubed 0.410 1.114 1.819
85 Debt/GDP < 50% 0.543 1.282 2.022
54 Debt/GDP ≥ 50% 0.192 1.025 1.858
Notes: CI low and up indicate the 95% confidence interval for the summability estimate S(δ)
constructed from subsampling – shaded cells indicate variable series where the summability
confidence interval includes zero. In all tests conducted I allow for deterministic terms (constant
and trend).
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Table 2: Co-Summability – ln(GDP pc) specifications
Start End obs Nonlinearity CI low δˆeˆt CI up Verdict
USA 1870 2010 141 - 0.467 1.049 1.631 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
b = 13 Debt/GDP squared 0.277 0.943 1.609 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
M = 129 Debt/GDP cubed 0.351 0.900 1.449 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
Threshold 50% 0.526 1.124 1.721 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
GBR 1830 2010 181 - 0.660 1.194 1.728 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
b = 14 Debt/GDP squared 0.699 1.196 1.693 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
M = 168 Debt/GDP cubed 0.702 1.196 1.689 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
Threshold 90% 0.653 1.208 1.763 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
Threshold 70% 0.656 1.224 1.791 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
Threshold 50% 0.668 1.284 1.899 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
SWE 1820 2010 191 - 0.777 1.546 2.314 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
b = 15 Debt/GDP squared 0.658 1.602 2.546 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
M = 177 Debt/GDP cubed 0.697 1.598 2.499 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
JPN 1872 2010 139 - 0.580 1.128 1.676 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
b = 13 Debt/GDP squared 0.236 0.873 1.511 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
M = 127 Debt/GDP cubed 0.181 0.821 1.460 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
Threshold 50% 0.857 2.056 3.256 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
Notes: In all models I take per capita GDP (in logarithms) as the dependent variable. CI low and
up indicate the 95% confidence interval for the co-summability estimates. In all tests conducted I
allow for deterministic terms (constant only; additional trends do not qualitatively change the
results). δˆeˆt 6= (=)0 implies that co-summability is (not) rejected. Obs reports the number of
observations, b = int
√
T + 1 refers to the time series length of each subsample, M = T − b+ 1
to the number of subsamples used in the analysis. Regarding the ‘Nonlinearity,’ the model with
ln(Debt/GDP)2 also includes ln(Debt/GDP), while the model with ln(Debt/GDP)3 also includes
ln(Debt/GDP)2 and ln(Debt/GDP).
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Table 4: Co-Summability – ln(GDP pc) specifications (sub-sample results for post-WWII period)
United States United Kingdom
M start end CI low δˆeˆt CI up Verdict CI low δˆeˆt CI up Verdict
1 1946 2005 0.051 0.699 1.347 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 0.080 0.936 1.792 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1947 2006 0.965 1.697 2.428 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 -0.126 0.725 1.577 S(δeˆt) = 0
1948 2007 0.886 1.435 1.984 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 0.072 1.024 1.977 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1949 2008 0.698 0.987 1.277 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 0.360 1.051 1.742 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1950 2009 0.704 0.964 1.225 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 0.220 0.738 1.256 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1951 2010 0.836 1.263 1.690 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 -0.145 0.551 1.247 S(δeˆt) = 0
2 1946 2005 -0.250 0.347 0.944 S(δeˆt) = 0 0.158 0.780 1.402 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1947 2006 -0.128 0.444 1.016 S(δeˆt) = 0 0.101 0.765 1.428 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1948 2007 0.504 1.573 2.641 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 0.375 1.170 1.966 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1949 2008 -0.741 0.903 2.548 S(δeˆt) = 0 0.385 1.048 1.711 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1950 2009 1.132 1.954 2.777 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 0.130 0.709 1.289 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1951 2010 0.777 1.169 1.561 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 -0.167 0.585 1.336 S(δeˆt) = 0
3 1946 2005 -0.924 0.277 1.478 S(δeˆt) = 0 0.057 0.648 1.238 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1947 2006 -0.913 0.233 1.379 S(δeˆt) = 0 -0.168 0.490 1.148 S(δeˆt) = 0
1948 2007 0.337 1.017 1.697 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 -0.361 0.488 1.336 S(δeˆt) = 0
1949 2008 -0.066 0.411 0.887 S(δeˆt) = 0 0.433 1.319 2.205 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1950 2009 0.008 0.482 0.956 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 -0.969 0.525 2.018 S(δeˆt) = 0
1951 2010 0.790 1.217 1.644 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 -0.159 0.982 2.123 S(δeˆt) = 0
Sweden Japan
M start end CI low δˆeˆt CI up Verdict CI low δˆeˆt CI up Verdict
1 1946 2005 0.558 0.974 1.391 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 0.205 0.794 1.383 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1947 2006 0.625 1.223 1.821 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 0.039 0.879 1.720 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1948 2007 0.575 1.265 1.955 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 0.311 1.234 2.156 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1949 2008 0.311 0.984 1.657 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 0.173 0.893 1.613 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1950 2009 0.075 0.899 1.722 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 0.099 0.913 1.726 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1951 2010 -0.174 1.127 2.428 S(δeˆt) = 0 0.380 1.402 2.423 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
2 1946 2005 -0.205 0.847 1.900 S(δeˆt) = 0 0.041 0.733 1.425 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1947 2006 0.039 1.071 2.103 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 0.225 0.876 1.526 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1948 2007 0.052 1.203 2.354 S(δeˆt) 6= 0 0.396 1.237 2.078 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1949 2008 -0.074 0.933 1.941 S(δeˆt) = 0 0.145 0.899 1.653 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1950 2009 -0.260 0.881 2.023 S(δeˆt) = 0 0.185 0.905 1.626 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1951 2010 -0.197 1.137 2.471 S(δeˆt) = 0 0.405 1.482 2.560 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
3 1946 2005 -0.092 0.823 1.738 S(δeˆt) = 0 -0.095 0.643 1.381 S(δeˆt) = 0
1947 2006 -0.200 0.947 2.094 S(δeˆt) = 0 -0.240 0.738 1.717 S(δeˆt) = 0
1948 2007 -0.241 1.146 2.532 S(δeˆt) = 0 0.106 1.120 2.133 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
1949 2008 -0.853 0.804 2.460 S(δeˆt) = 0 -0.104 0.786 1.677 S(δeˆt) = 0
1950 2009 -0.201 0.621 1.444 S(δeˆt) = 0 -0.388 0.858 2.103 S(δeˆt) = 0
1951 2010 -0.020 0.853 1.727 S(δeˆt) = 0 0.317 1.332 2.347 S(δeˆt) 6= 0
Notes: This table presents results for sub-sample co-summability testing. Model (M ) 1-3 refer to
the following specifications: 1 – linear, 2 – linear and squared, 3 – linear, squared and cubed
debt/GDP terms (in logs). In each case I report statistics from the sixty-year samples, with start
and end years as indicated in the table, focusing on the period after 1945. Shaded cells indicate
sub-samples where the co-summability confidence interval includes zero – note however that
these confidence intervals are at times very large, such that they further include 1 and at times
even 2 (the latter options are represented by darker shading). See Table 2 for all other details.
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